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Abstract
In a multiple-unit, uniform-price sealed-bid auction where price is the lowest ac-
cepted bid, we show that the ordering constraint between bids may become active. We
point out that Draaisma and Noussair (1997)'s partial characterization of symmetric,
strictly monotone equilibria neglects this constraint.
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11 Bid-Pooling
We study multiple-unit auctions in which k ¸ 2 units are for sale, and bidders have symmetric
independent private values. If each bidder has use for only one unit, the multiple-unit
auction inherits most of the theoretical properties of the single-unit auction (?? (rjw); Branco
(1996); Vickrey (1961)). papers study the bidding strategies of multiple-unit auctions when
each bidder demands two units. Vickrey (1961) show the incentive-compatibility of the
multiple-unit Vickrey auction. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) study the pay-your-
bid discriminatory auction. Noussair (1995) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1999) study the
uniform-price auction (UPFR auction) where price is the ¯rst-rejected (highest-rejected) bid.
Draaisma and Noussair (1997) study another version of the uniform-price auction (UPLA
auction) where price is the last-accepted (lowest-accepted) bid.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) shows that in the discriminatory auction, the
pooling of bids, or the submitting of identical bids when the valuation of two goods are
di®erent, can occur. However, in the UPFR auction, Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1999) shows
that the ¯rst bid of each bidder is truth-telling and the second bid is shaded. Thus, pooling
cannot occur in the UPFR auction. In the UPLA auction, we show by example that pooling
can occur. It is contrary to the implicit assumption in Draaisma and Noussair (1997) that
the bid-ordering constraint is inactive.
Draaisma and Noussair (1997) report a partial characterization of a class of symmetric,
strictly monotonic equilibria to a multi-unit UPLA auction. Each bidder i simultaneously
submits two bids, denoted by bi
1 and bi
2, where bi
1 ¸ bi
2. Let vi
1 be the higher valued unit,
and vi
2 be the lower valued unit. A pure strategy is a mapping from valuations into bids
B(v1;v2) = (B1(v1;v2);B2(v1;v2)), where B1(v1;v2) ¸ B2(v1;v2). They present the ¯rst-
order necessary conditions, from which it is shown that any strictly monotone symmetric
equilibrium strategy B¤(¢;¢) is separable, i.e., B¤(v1;v2) = (B¤
1(v1);B¤
2(v2)).
Let E¼i(bi
1;bi
2) be the expected pro¯t of bidder i with values (vi
1;vi
2) and bids (bi
1;bi
2).
Draaisma and Noussair (1997) correctly show that @
@bi
jE¼i(bi
1;bi
2) is independent of bi
j0 where
j0 6= j. However, they conclude without justi¯cation that bi
j = B¤
j(vi
j) is independent of
2bi
j0. Such a conclusion is correct in the case of unconstrained optimization, but not in a
general constrained optimization. They have neglected the inequality constraint bi
1 ¸ bi
2 in
the derivation of the Kuhn-Tucker condition. (See Page 159, (2)). Consequently, their results
(Lemma 1 and Proposition 1) are valid only when the constraint bi
1 ¸ bi
2 is redundant.
2 Example
In this section we present an example in which bi
1 ¸ bi
2 is not redundant, and a weakly
monotone symmetric equilibrium strategy may not be separable. While this example does
not disprove the Draaisma and Noussair (1997) result, we show non-separability of bids, and
thus the pooling of bids can occur.
Suppose there are two symmetric bidders indexed by i = 1;2. There are two units for
sale. The values (V i
1;V i
2) of bidder i have continuous densities and compact supports [1
2;1]
and [0; 1
2], respectively. Let B¤(v1;v2) be a strictly monotone (i.e., increasing) symmetric
equilibrium strategy. We ¯rst prove that in this example, there exists no strictly monotone
bidding strategy that is separable.
Assume, by the way of contradiction, the separability of B¤(v1;v2) = (B¤
1(v1);B¤
2(v2))
as in Lemma 1 of Draaisma and Noussair (1997). Let (Di
1;Di
2) = (B¤
1(V i
1);B¤
2(V i
2)) be the
ex ante distribution of bids for bidder i. Let H1 be the cumulative density function of D1
1
(and also of D2
1 by symmetry). Similarly, let H2 be the cumulative density function of D1
2
(and also of D2
2). Let h1 and h2 be the corresponding probability density functions. It is
easy to verify B¤
1(v1) · v1 and B¤
2(v2) · v2 for all v1 and v2, and it follows that both Di
1
and Di
2 have bounded supports. By the strict monotonicity of B¤(¢;¢) and the continuity
of (V i
1;V i
2)'s density, H1 strictly increases from 0 to 1 in [B¤
1(1
2);B¤
1(1)], while H2 strictly
increases from 0 to 1 in [B¤
2(0);B¤
2(1
2)].
Now we claim B¤
1(1) = B¤
2(1
2), i.e., the right endpoints of the distribution of bids H1 and
H2 are the same. To see this, we recall the partial derivatives of bidder i's expected pro¯t
3as given in expression (2) of Draaisma and Noussair (1997), for b1
1;b1
2 > 0:
@E¼i(bi
1;bi
2)
@bi
1
= (v
i
1 ¡ b
i
1)h2(b
i
1) ¡ (H2(b
i
1) ¡ H1(b
i
1)); and (1)
@E¼i(b1
i;bi
2)
@bi
2
= (v
i
2 ¡ b
i
2)h1(b
i
2) ¡ 2(H1(b
i
2)): (2)
Let t1 = B¤
1(1) and t2 = B¤
2(1
2). If t1 < t2, there is positive probability that b2 2 (t1;t2),
violating the constraint b1 ¸ b2 since b1 · t1. If t1 > t2, then for b1 2 (t2;t1), the ¯rst term
in (1) is 0 since h2(b1) = 0. The second term is strictly negative, implying that perturbing
b1 downward improves the expected pro¯t. Thus, we conclude t1 = t2. This result can be
informally obtained by observing that one bidder's ¯rst bid competes with the other bidder's
second bid.
Let v1 = 1
2 and v2 = 1
2. If we assume the strict monotonicity of B¤
1, we obtain
B
¤
1(v1) < B
¤
1(1) = t1 = t2 = B
¤
2(
1
2
);
violating the bid-ordering constraint B¤
1(v1) ¸ B¤
2(v2) for all v1 ¸ v2. Thus, B¤ is not a
separable function. This completes the proof.
In particular, suppose (V 1
1 ;V 1
2 );(V 2
1 ;V 2
2 ) » (U[1
2;1];U[0; 1
2]). We show that weakly mono-
tone symmetric functions B¤
1 and B¤
2 satisfying the ¯rst-order conditions (1) and (2) may
violate the inequality constraint b1 ¸ b2. Let
B
¤
1(v1) =
8
<
:
2
3v1 + 1
24 = 2
3(v1 ¡ 1
2) + 3
8 if v1 2 [1
2; 9
16]
5
12 if v1 2 [ 9
16;1]
B
¤
2(v2) =
8
<
:
v2 if v1 2 [0; 3
8]
1
3v2 + 1
4 = 1
3(v2 ¡ 3
8) + 3
8 if v1 2 [3
8; 1
2]:
4It follows
H1(b1) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if b1 2 [0; 3
8]
3(b1 ¡ 3
8) if b1 2 [3
8; 5
12)
1 if b1 2 [ 5
12;1]
H2(b2) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
2b2 if b2 2 [0; 3
8]
6(b2 ¡ 3
8) + 3
4 if b2 2 [3
8; 5
12]
1 if b2 2 [ 5
12;1]:
It is easy to verify the ¯rst-order conditions (i.e., setting (1) and (2) equal to zero) when
v1 2 (1
2; 9
16) and v2 2 (3
8; 1
2) (corresponding to b1;b2 2 (3
8; 5
12)). Indeed, B¤
1 and B¤
2 maximize
the unconstrained objective function E¼i. However, with positive probability, the constraint
b1 ¸ b2 is violated, and it follows that B¤
1 and B¤
2 are not separable.
We remark that B¤
1 and B¤
2 are neither strictly monotone nor feasible. Thus, this example
is not a counter-example of the Draaisma and Noussair (1997) results. It points out that
their proof is incomplete.
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